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Does the government have the authority to alter the terms of an 
agreement between private parties that it deems unfair? At first pass, 
most Americans would agree that it does not. Of course, exceptions 
apply. American courts exercise the right to break up monopolies,1 





†John Peiserich has been practicing in Arkansas since 2002 with a focus on oil, gas, 
and environmental issues. He routinely represents clients before the Arkansas 
Department of Energy and Environment, both the Division of Oil & Gas and the 
Division of Environmental Quality, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and 
other governmental agencies, and litigates complex oil, gas, and environmental 
issues.  
 1. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).  
 2. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (2018).  
 3. See GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Lamb, 487 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Ark. 2016) 
(citing LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Ark. 2013)), 
discussing procedural unconscionability, in which there is an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of the parties together with terms that are unreasonable 
favorable to the other party, and substantive unconscionability, which generally 
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The Arkansas Supreme Court recently extended these exceptions to 
include agreements that involve the complex realm of oil and gas law. 
The forced integration of interest owners in a drilling unit compels 
administrative agencies to consider who among the unit owners, 
lessees, and operators owes what to whom. Additionally, the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity governs whether an aggrieved party may even 
challenge such a determination by a government agency. Through a 
two-part decision, the Supreme Court of Arkansas clarified that the 
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (the “Commission”) has the 
authority to evaluate the fairness of compensation owed by a unit 
operator to a party who does not consent to integration. Within this 
industry-specific holding, which this Article will show was a natural 
development of state oil and gas law, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
notably also reinforced that sovereign immunity does not bar a party’s 
right to judicial review of administrative decisions, but it signaled a 
significant pivot away from traditional agency deference. 
Part II of this Article discusses the statutory and regulatory 
framework of Arkansas oil and gas law as it relates to the Court’s 
decision. Part III tracks the journey of the case through the Arkansas 
courts. Part IV analyzes the courts’ decisions on the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, judicial deference to agency decisions, and the 
Commission’s general authority, concluding that the Court properly 
applied Arkansas law and did not expand the Commission’s authority.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission 
In 1939, the Arkansas Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act 
created the Commission and gave it the authority to regulate the 
production of oil and gas.4 Pursuant to this authority, the Commission 
adopted spacing regulations that limit the number of wells that can be 
drilled in a drilling unit.5 Because a drilling unit is often comprised of 
many property owners, the Commission further has authority to, and 
in fact must, order all tracts and interests to integrate on the application 
 
involves excessive price or restriction of remedies. 
 4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-71-101 (2019) (legislative creation); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-71-110 (2019) (legislative charge); 1938 Ark. Acts 105, 219 (codified as 
amended at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 15-72-101-407); Thomas A. Daily, Rules Done 
Right: How Arkansas Brought its Oil and Gas Law into a Horizontal World, 68 ARK. 
L. REV. 259, 265 (2015). 
 5. 178-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § B-3 (2020). 
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of any mineral owner or operator if all parties do not voluntarily pool 
their interests.6 Pooling is the integration of separately-owned tracts of 
land in a drilling unit, where drilling and production costs are shared 
among lessees (also known as the working-interest owners), and 
revenue is shared by all owners of mineral rights in the unit.7 These 
owners may agree on a plan of development for the unit and 
voluntarily pool their interests, or the Commission may order forced 
pooling through the integration process.8 
If the Commission orders integration, an unleased mineral owner 
generally has three choices, which will be specified in an integration 
order: (1) participate in the well by paying a proportionate share of 
production costs (and assuming a share of the initial financial risk) and 
taking a share of production revenues;9 (2) lease his or her interest to 
the unit operators and receive a negotiated royalty, not less than one-
eighth, plus a bonus that the Commission determines;10 or (3) “go non-
consent” and allow the participating owners to cover the non-
consenting owner’s share of upfront production costs.11 An owner who 
elects the third option will only receive his or her proportionate share 
of production revenue (less an additional “risk factor” penalty set by 
the Commission) after the participating interest owners recoup the 
initial production costs.12  
B. Judicial Review 
The Commission’s integration order is a final agency action, which 
sets forth the integration options for affected mineral interest owners.13 
Therefore, the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) 
governs all appeals of integration orders.14 Under the APA, any 
interested party who has exhausted their administrative remedies 
 
 6. Phillip E. Norvell, Prelude to the Future of Shale Gas Development: Well 
Spacing and Integration for the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 
457, 463 (2010) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-303(b) (2019); see also Patrick H. 
Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Responses to a 
New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 326 (2014). 
 7. Patrick H. Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative 
Responses to a New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 327 (2014). 
 8. Norvell, supra note 6, at 463 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-303(a)). 
 9. Id. at 464 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(3)). 
 10. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4), (d)). 
 11. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. 178-00-001-A-(2)(l) ARK. CODE R. § B-3 (2020). 
 14. Id. 
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through the Commission may appeal the integration order in circuit 
court with the Commission as the defendant.15  
C. Agency Deference 
Reviewing courts must determine the deference that should be 
given to agency decisions, such as Commission integration orders. 
The challenging party has the burden of proving an absence of 
substantial evidence to support an agency’s factual findings.16 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court has not applied a consistent standard of 
deference regarding agencies’ interpretations of statutes.17 In some 
cases, the Court conducted a de novo review, explaining that it is the 
court’s power to interpret statutes.18 In other cases, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court adopted a de novo but deferential “clearly wrong” 
review for an agency’s statutory interpretation19 or has omitted the de 
novo standard and announced only the deferential “clearly wrong” 
review.20  
D. Arkansas Sovereign Immunity 
Because any judicial challenge to a Commission integration order 
requires a suit against the state of Arkansas, sovereign immunity must 
also be considered. Sovereign immunity is currently a hot topic in 
Arkansas that has been revisited in multiple recent Arkansas Supreme 
Court decisions.  
Article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution provides that 
“[t]he [s]tate of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her 
courts.”21 Prior to 2018, the Arkansas Supreme Court routinely held 
that sovereign immunity may be overcome when an agency is acting 
illegally, or, since 1996, when the legislature specifically waives 
sovereign immunity, which it has done in numerous state statutes.22 
 
 15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-106(a) (2019). 
 16. Ark. Racing Comm’n v. Wayne Ward, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Ark. 2001). 
 17. Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 616–17 (Ark. 2020) (“We 
acknowledge confusion in prior cases regarding the standard of review for agency 
interpretations of a statute . . . .”). 
 18. Miller v. Enders, 425 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Ark. 2013); Ark. Game & Fish 
Comm’n v. Gerard, 541 S.W.3d 422, 425–26 (Ark. 2018). 
 19. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Pierce, 435 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Ark. 2014); 
McLane S., Inc. v. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd., 375 S.W.3d 628, 640 (Ark. 2010). 
 20. See, e.g., Brookshire v. Adcock, 307 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Ark. 2009). 
 21. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20. 
 22. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 425 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2013); 
Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v. Staton, 942 S.W.2d 804 (Ark. 1996) (citing ARK. 
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This changed with the issuance of Board of Trustees of University of 
Arkansas v. Andrews, in which the Arkansas Supreme Court departed 
from earlier precedent and held that the Arkansas General Assembly 
cannot waive the state’s sovereign immunity.23 In that case, a 
terminated employee of a state community college brought an action 
against the college under the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act 
(“AMWA”) for failing to compensate him for overtime.24 The Court 
acknowledged previous holdings that the legislature could waive 
sovereign immunity but ultimately concluded that AMWA’s provision 
allowing suits against the state for unpaid overtime wages was 
incompatible with article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution.25 
In reaching its decision, the Andrews Court explained, “[a] suit 
against the [s]tate is barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine if a 
judgment for the plaintiff will operate to control the action of the 
[s]tate or subject it to liability.” Based on this description of sovereign 
immunity, the Court held that “suits subjecting the state to financial 
liability are barred by sovereign immunity and that plaintiffs like 
Andrews with these causes of actions have a proper avenue for redress 
against [s]tate action, which is to file a claim with the Arkansas Claims 
Commission.”26 The only exception to this broadened view of 
sovereign immunity explicitly recognized in Andrews applies when 
the government is operating “illegally.”27 
Though the Court cautioned in a footnote in a subsequent case 
upholding Andrews that it “should not be interpreted too broadly,”28 
the implications of the Andrews decision are extensive. Under a literal 
reading of the Andrews opinion, Arkansas state courts would no longer 
have jurisdiction to conduct appellate review of any final agency 
action (including Commission integration orders) despite the many 
statutes guaranteeing an appeal.29 
 
CODE ANN. § 26-18-507(e)(2)(A)); See discussion infra Section III.B.1, IV.A.  
 23. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Ark. 2018). 
 24. Id. at 617 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -222). 
 25. Id. at 622. 
 26. Id. at 619. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Ark. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs v. Mallett, 549 S.W.3d 351, 352 n.2 (Ark. 
2018). 
 29. Compare Andrews, 535 S.W.3d at 619, with ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212 
(right to judicial review under the APA). 
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III. HURD ET. AL. V. ARKANSAS OIL AND GAS COMMISSION 
A. Factual Background 
All of the legal issues described above came together in two 
Arkansas Supreme Court opinions arising from a dispute between 
members of the Hurd and Killam families (collectively, “the Hurds”) 
and a natural gas production company, SWN Production Arkansas, 
LLC, formerly known as SEECO, Inc. (“SWN”). SWN was the 
operator of numerous oil and gas wells in the Fayetteville Shale area. 
In 2010, the Hurds leased mineral interests in Cleburne County, 
Arkansas, which the Commission then integrated into two units 
naming SWN as the designated operator.30 Importantly, these 
contained a “stratigraphic Pugh clause.”31 
Oil and gas leases executed in the Fayetteville Shale generally 
include all oil and gas owned by the lessor beneath the leased 
premises. Accordingly, no further leasing or integration of most 
mineral owners is required to drill into a different formation within a 
producing unit. However, some sophisticated owners (like the Hurds) 
insert a stratigraphic Pugh clause into their leases that causes their oil 
and gas lease to terminate to depths below the deepest producing 
interval after a specified time. This type of clause can be attractive to 
lessors who want a “second bite at the apple” and want to gamble on 
getting a higher royalty later if there is additional development in their 
unit. Along with this potential benefit, a lessor with a stratigraphic 
Pugh clause also risks a possible decline in the market.32 
Because there had been no natural gas production below the 
Fayetteville Shale formation during the primary term, the Hurds 
became unleased as to any depths below the Fayetteville Shale 
formation.33 Accordingly, when SWN sought to drill natural gas wells 
to the lower Moorefield Shale formation in 2017, the Hurds’ interests 
in this formation had to be re-leased or otherwise integrated.34 Based 
on market conditions at the time, SWN began offering unleased 
mineral owners, including the Hurds, a new lease that included either 
a one-seventh royalty or a $100 per acre bonus and a one-eighth 
royalty.35 
 
 30. Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Ark. 2020). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Appellant’s Br. at Addendum 325, Hurd, 601 S.W.3d 100 (No. 19-808). 
 33. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 101. 
 34. Id. at 101–02. 
 35. Id. at 102. 
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In February 2017, SWN requested that the Commission integrate 
two units for the purpose of drilling in the Moorefield Shale 
formation.36 On March 6, 2017, the Commission granted SWN’s 
application and issued two integration orders that included provisions 
allowing a period of time for unleased mineral interest owners to either 
participate in the costs of completing and operating the well or to “go 
non-consent.”37 As to interest owners who elected to go non-consent, 
both integration orders provided: 
 
6.B. Uncommitted Leasehold Working Interest 
Owner(s) 
Leasehold royalty shall be paid according to the 
provisions of the valid lease(s) existing for each 
separately owned tract, except where the Commission 
finds that such lease(s) provide for an excessive, 
unreasonably high rate of royalty, as compared with the 
royalty determined by the Commission to be 
reasonable and consistent with the royalty negotiated 
for lease(s) made at arm’s length in the general area 
where the Unit is located . . . .38 
 
Upon hearing of the integration applications, SWN subsequently 
learned that the Hurds had executed self-dealing leases between their 
own family-owned oil and gas companies with a 25% royalty.39 On 
March 8, 2017, SWN filed supplemental applications with the 
Commission, stating that it expected the Hurds to go non-consent, 
thereby exempting them from shouldering any production costs or 
financial risk.40 SWN alleged that the 25% royalty attempted in the 
Hurds’ leases was unreasonable and asked the Commission to set a 
reasonable royalty rate.41 
At an evidentiary hearing held in June 2017, SWN presented 
evidence that gas prices had declined since 2010, SWN was the only 
company taking Moorefield-only leases, and the highest bonus and 
royalty paid for Moorefield-only interests in the relevant sections was 
 
 36. Id. at 101–02. 
 37. Id. at 102. 
 38. Appellant’s Br. at Addendum 177, Hurd, 601 S.W.3d 100 (Ark. 2020) (No. 
19-808). 
 39. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 102.   
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 102–03. 
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what SWN offered to the Hurds and other unleased mineral owners.42 
The Hurds argued, conversely, that a 20–25% royalty was reasonable 
based on estimated production from the recoverable reserve.43 The 
Commission held that any royalty rate over one-seventh was excessive 
and unreasonably high based on the circumstances and entered 
supplemental integration orders capping SWN’s royalty obligations to 
the Hurds at one-seventh.44  
1. The Circuit Court Dismissal 
The Hurds petitioned for judicial review of the Commission’s 
supplemental integration, arguing that the supplemental integration 
orders were outside the Commission’s statutory authority and were 
arbitrary and capricious.45 Less than one week before the court was set 
to hear the matter, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
the landmark Andrews case, holding that the state legislature does not 
have the power to waive sovereign immunity and prompting the 
Commission to file a motion to dismiss in Hurd.46 The court dismissed 
the Hurds’ petition, finding that sovereign immunity barred the Hurds 
from seeking judicial review. But the circuit court also took it a step 
further, finding the adjudicatory provisions of the APA 
unconstitutional in light of Andrews and that because there was no 
right of review of the Commission’s orders, any such orders were void 
from the start.47 The Commission and SWN appealed, and the Hurds 
filed a cross-appeal.48  
B. The First Arkansas Supreme Court Decision (2018) 
The first appeal focused solely on the threshold sovereign immunity 
issue. Interestingly, all parties challenged the circuit court’s order of 
dismissal. The Commission argued that the court lacked jurisdiction 
 
 42. Id. at 103. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Appellant’s Abstract, Br., and Addendum at Ab. 98–99, Hurd, 601 S.W.3d 
100 (Ark. 2020) (No. CV-19-808).   
 45. Pet. for Review ¶ 18, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052 
(Ark. Cir. Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-
212(h)). 
 46. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Ark. 2018); 
See Resp’ts Mot. to Dismiss, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052 
(Ark. Cir. Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961). 
 47. Order ¶ 8, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052 (Ark. Cir. 
Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961).   
 48. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 249 (Ark. 2018). 
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to invalidate the APA and the Commission’s orders after it found that 
the petition was barred by sovereign immunity.49 SWN contended that 
original actions seeking monetary damages from the state are 
distinguishable from petitions for review of an administrative decision 
and that applying sovereign immunity to bar judicial review of agency 
actions would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by delegating 
final adjudication of rights to the executive branch.50 The Hurds 
argued that judicial review of an agency action is constitutional 
because sovereign immunity is waivable and that judicial review was 
proper because the Commission exceeded its authority by reducing the 
royalty rates in their leases.51  
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with SWN’s first argument, 
reiterating its Andrews holding that sovereign immunity applies when 
a judgment for the plaintiff would control the action of the state or 
subject the state to liability.52 The Court agreed with SWN that the role 
of the Commission, though named as defendant in the matter, was like 
a trial court in an appellate proceeding: it had no vested interest in the 
outcome of the appeal.53 The Court found sovereign immunity was 
therefore inapplicable even under Andrews and also reversed the 
circuit court’s ruling, declaring the adjudicatory provisions of the APA 
unconstitutional and the Commission’s orders void from the start.54 
The Court remanded the Hurds’ cross-appeal.55 On remand, the circuit 
court affirmed the Commission’s decision, and the Hurds appealed.56 
C. The Second Arkansas Supreme Court Decision (2020) 
1. Agency Deference and Separation of Powers 
The lawsuit was appealed a second time in 2020—this time on the 
merits. The Arkansas Supreme Court ultimately upheld the integration 
orders entered by the Commission. In doing so, the Court reinforced 
 
 49. Id. at 253. 
 50. Appellant SWN Prod. (Ark.), LLC’s Brief at Arg. 6-9, Ark. Oil & Gas 
Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2018) (No. 18-233) (citing Singleton v. 
City of Pine Bluff, 285 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Ark. App. 2008)). 
 51. Appellees/Cross Appellant’s Supplemental Abstract, Brief, and 
Supplemental Addendum at Arg. 3-23, Ark. Oil. & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 
S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2018) (No. 18-233). 
 52. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d at 253. 
 53. Id. at 255 (citing Duit Constr. Co. v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 476 S.W.3d 
791, 795 (Ark. 2015). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100 at 101 (Ark. 2020).  
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its indication of a pivot on agency deference first announced earlier 
this year in Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., Ltd., which held that courts 
must review agency interpretations of statutes de novo because it is 
solely within the judiciary’s power to interpret statutes. In the 2020 
Hurd decision, the Court reiterated that while it gives unambiguous 
statutes their plain meaning, “where ambiguity exists, the agency’s 
interpretation will be one of [the court’s] many tools used to provide 
guidance.”57 
As to the scope of the Commission’s authority to set a reasonable 
royalty rate, the Court’s decision focused on both Arkansas Code 
Annotated section 15-71-110(a)(1), which authorizes the Commission 
to enforce its statutory powers58 and Arkansas Code Annotated section 
15-72-304(a), which provides: 
 
[a]ll orders requiring integration shall be . . . upon 
terms and conditions that are just and reasonable and 
that will afford the owner of each tract or interest in the 
drilling unit the opportunity to recover or receive his or 
her just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the 
pool without unnecessary expense . . . .59 
 
The Court found that this clear and unambiguous language gave the 
Commission explicit authority to ensure that all integration orders are 
entered upon “just and reasonable” terms.60 While there is no statute 
specifically stating that the Commission may reduce the royalty rate 
in a lease to a reasonable market rate, the Court reasoned that there is 
also no statute requiring consenting parties, such as SWN, to pay 
royalties to an uncommitted leasehold working-interest owner who 
elects to go non-consent.61 The Court agreed with SWN’s argument 
that it would be impracticable for statutes to cover every possible 
situation that an agency may encounter in carrying out its statutory 
duties and that state agencies, including the Commission, have both 
powers that are explicitly conferred by statute and that are necessarily 
implied from a statute.62 Because the Commission’s reduction of the 
 
 57. Id. at 104 (citing Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Ark. 
2020)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 104–05. 
 60. Id. at 105. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. (citing Walker v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 365 S.W.3d 899, 911 (Ark. 
2010)).  
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royalty to a reasonable rate was authorized by statute, the Court held 
that the supplemental integration orders were neither ultra vires nor 
arbitrary and capricious and affirmed the Commission’s supplemental 
integration orders.63 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. What the Hurd Decisions Mean for Sovereign Immunity 
1. Analysis of Arkansas Supreme Court’s Reasoning (2018) 
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s 2018 Hurd decision turned on 
whether sovereign immunity barred judicial review of the 
Commission’s actions.64 While Andrews was premised on damages 
being sought from the state, the Court failed to distinguish between a 
claim for damages and appellate review of final agency action.65 As 
SWN argued, the destruction of traditional judicial review of agency 
actions would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine and 
improperly delegate absolute authority to the executive branch; an 
agency’s actions are through the executive branch, so the agency has 
no power to usurp the function of the judiciary and enter a final 
adjudication of property or contractual rights.66 
Barring judicial review would trigger other legal complications as 
well. Many federal regulatory statutes allow states to administer the 
provisions of various acts but require that the delegated state 
authorities have adequate implementation and enforcement powers.67 
For example, Clean Water Act regulations require state programs to 
 
 63. Id. at 106.  
 64. See Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 254 (Ark. 2020). 
 65. The Court did emphasize the availability of the Arkansas Claims 
Commission, see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623 
(Ark. 2018), which does not provide appellate review of agency action. 
 66. Appellant SWN’s Brief at Arg. 9, Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 1564 
S.W.3d 248 (citing Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 285 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2008)). 
 67. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), (c)(3) (the Clean Water Act requires states 
to possess “adequate authority” to carry out and “abate violations” of the program, 
including through penalties); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(1), 7412(l)(5–6) (the Clean Air 
Act requires that state procedure must be adequate to implement and enforce New 
Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
requires states to provide adequate enforcement of compliance with program 
requirements). 
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guarantee judicial review for agency decisions to retain their delegated 
authority.68 
The first circuit court decision in Hurd held that the Andrews 
decision did in fact bar judicial review of agency actions.69 The court 
reasoned that the adjudicatory provisions of the APA left citizens 
without a mechanism to challenge agency actions, thereby violating 
the guarantees of due process found in the Arkansas Constitution and 
the United States Constitution.70  
The Arkansas Supreme Court took this opportunity to narrow the 
Andrews holding: judicial review of an agency decision is not barred 
by sovereign immunity because the agency is not a real party-in-
interest. The subject of the adjudication—the amount of royalty SWN 
owed to the Hurds—did not affect the state’s funds or control its 
actions.71 
The Court backtracked from Andrews’s extreme result of a circuit 
court striking the substantial statutory and regulatory framework as 
well as thousands of judicial opinions that allow for judicial review of 
agency decisions.72 However, the justices could not agree that the 
Hurd decision cleared up Arkansas’s sovereign immunity law.73 
Justice Baker dissented and urged that the Andrews court held that 
“never means never” as stated in the Arkansas Constitution’s 
sovereign immunity provision.74 The fact that Hurd involved a review 
of an agency decision did not make it distinguishable from Andrews 
because the Court did not identify any exceptions to sovereign 
immunity in Andrews.75 Justice Baker further insisted, as she did in 
her dissent in Andrews, that the Arkansas Constitution does not limit 
sovereign immunity to money judgments. Therefore, the majority’s 
holding that sovereign immunity did not apply because the suit did not 
affect the state’s funds or action was inaccurate.76 Justice Baker 
 
 68. 40 C.F.R. § 123.30 (2012). 
 69. Order ¶ 7, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052 (Ark. Cir. 
Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961).  
 70. Id. ¶ 4–8; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 13 (promises citizens the right to a remedy 
for all wrongs suffered in person, property, or character); See BE&K Const. Co. v. 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 536 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution protects citizens’ rights to petition the government and access 
the courts).  
 71. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Ark. 2018).. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 258 (Baker, J.. dissenting); Id. at 256 (Hart, J., concurring).  
 74. Id. at 258 (Baker, J., dissenting). . 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623 
(Ark. 2018) (Baker, J., dissenting). 
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concluded that the Commission’s decision constituted state conduct, 
so the Andrews holding barred suit.77 
Justice Hart concurred, citing Justice Baker’s concerns regarding 
the scope of Andrews.78 She posited that continuing to awkwardly 
develop sovereign immunity jurisprudence in light of Andrews is 
unsustainable; the court should instead “wipe the slate” on sovereign 
immunity.79 She pointed to the lack of constitutional analysis in 
Andrews and the majority’s failure to define the opinion’s limitations, 
which led to extensive litigation by public and private parties trying to 
either weaponize or escape from Andrews.80  
2. Subsequent Application of Andrews 
The Court had occasion to apply Andrews again in 2019. In 
Monsanto Company v. Arkansas State Plant Board, Monsanto 
objected to the Plant Board’s promulgation of certain rules that would 
prohibit the use of a particular pesticide. Monsanto framed each of its 
claims to seek injunctive or declaratory relief for alleged illegal or 
unconstitutional activity by the Plant Board or its members.81 The 
parties agreed that sovereign immunity should not bar actions to enjoin 
ultra vires government conduct, even after Andrews, but disagreed as 
to whether the Plant Board’s conduct was ultra vires.82 The circuit 
court dismissed all claims, explaining that Andrews precluded judicial 
review of all agency actions, even ultra vires actions.83  
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the Monsanto decision, 
finding that the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity was intact 
and applicable to the case.84 Specifically, where a claim is based on 
alleged ultra vires conduct on the part of the state and the claimant 
seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, sovereign immunity is 
inapplicable.85  
 
 77. Id. at 259 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 256 (Hart, J., concurring).  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Monsanto Co. v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 576 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ark. 2019). 
 82. Id. at 11. 
 83. Id. at 11–12. 
 84. Id. at 13. 
 85. Id. (citing Martin v. Haas, 556 S.W.3d 509, 509 (Ark. 2018) in which a voter 
brought an action against the Arkansas Secretary of State, seeking to declare a 
legislative act unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement).  
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Justice Baker again dissented and opined that Andrews in fact did 
not provide for an ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity.86 She 
further stated that “until Andrews is overruled, suit against the [s]tate 
is barred, and the majority cannot pick and choose when an exception 
or exemption may apply.”87 
Because the Arkansas Supreme Court decision in Andrews sparked 
confusion in Arkansas courts, the Court’s decision in Hurd signals 
movement toward a clearer and more practical understanding of 
sovereign immunity. Whether the Court will explicitly overturn 
Andrews remains to be seen. 
B. Hurd, the Myers Standard, and the Future of Agency Deference in 
Arkansas 
In Hurd, the appellants challenged the lower court’s ruling by 
contending that agency deference impermissibly conflicted with the 
separation-of-powers doctrine.88 The Court used Hurd to emphasize 
its recently announced adoption of the Myers standard of review for 
agency deference and held that there was “no need to further discuss 
[the] appellants’ argument in this regard.”89 The Court reiterated this 
new view of agency deference in Hurd, holding: 
 
[W]e clarify today that agency interpretations of 
statutes will be reviewed de novo. After all, it is the 
province and duty of this Court to determine what a 
statute means. In considering the meaning and effect of 
a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the 
words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in 
common language. An unambiguous statute will be 
interpreted based solely on the clear meaning of the 
text. But where ambiguity exists, the agency’s 
interpretation will be one of our many tools used to 
provide guidance.90 
 
In Myers, Mary Myers, the wife of a steel plant ladleman who died 
from injuries suffered while working in his plant’s melt shop, came 
 
 86. Id. at 14–15 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 87. Id. at 15 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 88. See Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100, 104 (Ark. 2020). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. (quoting Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 618 (Ark. 2020) 
(internal citations omitted)).  
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before the court to dispute an order from the Arkansas Workers’ 
Compensation Commission (“AWCC”) that held the parent 
companies of her late husband’s direct employer were immune from 
liability for her husband’s death.91 In making its decision, the AWCC 
interpreted Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-105(a) and held 
that the parent companies of Mrs. Myers’s late husband were entitled 
to statutory immunity from suit.92 The court of appeals affirmed the 
decision; Mrs. Meyers then appealed to the Arkansas Supreme 
Court.93 
In deciding Myers, the Arkansas Supreme Court novelly held that 
“it is for this Court to determine what a constitutional or statutory 
provision means” and that the Court does not afford deference to 
agency interpretation.94 The Court discussed what it perceived as a 
sometimes inconsistent history of standards used for agency 
deference.95 The Court identified the application of “de novo but 
deferential ‘clearly wrong’ review” where issues of statutory 
interpretation are reviewed de novo, but the interpretation made by an 
agency charged with administration is entitled to deference and should 
not be overturned unless clearly wrong.96 The Court identified another 
standard that was strictly based on the deferential “clearly wrong” 
review with no mention or use of the de novo standard.97 
Relying on the separation-of-powers doctrine, the Court in Meyers 
was the first to specifically disapprove of giving deference to agency 
interpretations of statutes, stating that doing so “effectively transfers 
the job of interpreting the law from the judiciary to the executive.”98 
The Court held that the proper standard of review is de novo and that 
an agency’s interpretation is merely a tool to use for guidance and not 
entitled to any deference.99 
In applying the Myers standard in Hurd, the Court effectively ended 
traditional agency deference in statutory interpretation. In Myers, the 
Court acknowledged the history of inconsistent applications of agency 
deference.100 While only applied so far in Myers and Hurd, the Court 
 
 91. See Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Ark. 2020).  
 92. See id. at 616. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 616. 
 95. See id. at 617. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. See id.  
 100. Id. 
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can be expected to now review all agency decisions de novo with no 
deference to any underlying agency interpretation. Neither dissent in 
Hurd addressed agency deference.101 Similarly, Justice Hart’s lone 
dissent in Myers did not discuss the majority’s new agency deference 
standard.102 Accordingly, the justices appear to be in agreement with 
the Myers standard of review. Only time will tell if the Court will 
continue to apply this new standard or if it will apply another variation 
to analyze agency decisions in the future. 
C. Hurd’s Implications on AOGC Powers 
Justice Hart, in her 2020 Hurd dissent, opined that allowing the 
Commission to reduce privately negotiated lease royalty rates to a 
reasonable market-based rate was an improper broadening of 
Commission powers.103 She further stated that forcing the Hurds to 
give up their property for less than the contract price amounted to a 
government taking of property.104 However, this statement is incorrect 
as the majority’s decision does not, in fact, expand the Commission’s 
powers.105 
1. The Commission Did Not Alter the Hurds’ Lease Terms 
Justice Hart mischaracterized the Commission’s actions in entering 
supplemental integration orders in this dispute. The Commission did 
not alter the terms of the leases that were negotiated between the Hurds 
and their family business. The Hurd family members, as lessors, were 
still entitled to a 25% royalty from their lessee, the family business.106 
The Court instead capped the obligation of the participating owners in 
the unit (SWN) who were not parties to the Hurd leases and who the 
Hurds sought to force to pay a higher-than-market royalty rate through 
a self-dealing lease.107 SWN’s obligation to pay the Hurds a 
reasonable royalty did not arise out of any leases; it was wholly 
contained in the integration orders, which the Commission had the 
statutory right to control.108 
 
 101. See Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100, 106–11 (Ark. 2020) 
(Baker, J., dissenting). 
 102. Myers, 597 S.W.3d at 620–22 (Hart, J., dissenting).  
 103. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 108 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 109 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 105 (the Commission’s authority  is necessarily implied from statute).  
 106. Id. at 102–03. 
 107. Id. at 105. 
 108. Id. 
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2. The Commission’s Statutory Authority Gives It Implied Power to 
Limit an Operator’s Royalty Obligation to a Non-Consenting Owner  
The Court agreed with SWN’s argument that the Commission’s 
power to limit SWN’s royalty obligations to the Hurds was necessarily 
implied from its statutory authority to ensure integration orders are just 
and reasonable.109  
Prior to Hurd, the statutory and regulatory framework of forced 
integration contained a glaring gap: participating owners are 
compensated with their proportionate share of production revenue;110 
owners who lease their interests to the unit operator will receive a 
“competitive” royalty and bonus to be determined by the Commission, 
but never less than a one-eighth share;111 but how will a non-
consenting owner be compensated during the recoupment period? For 
twenty-five years, this gap has been filled by language common to 
integration orders: the operator, on behalf of the participating parties, 
will pay to a non-consenting party the royalty rate contained in its 
existing lease, unless the Commission finds that rate to be excessive 
or unreasonably high.112 The Hurd decision finally confirmed this 
practice as a proper exercise of the Commission’s statutory 
authority.113  
3. The Commission is Not Likely to Apply Hurd Too Broadly  
Justice Hart asserts that the 2020 Hurd decision could lead to the 
Commission disregarding royalty rates in any other mineral lease and, 
in any case, will lead to subjective and disparate treatment of interest 
owners throughout Arkansas.114 This fear stems from a 
misunderstanding of the Commission’s action at the center of this 
case. 
The Commission has the implied power to determine reasonable 
compensation between participating parties and non-consenting 
 
 109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(a) (2020); see also Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 105 
(citing Walker v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 365 S.W.3d 899, 911 (Ark. 2010) (quoting 
that State agencies possess such powers as are conferred by statute or are necessarily 
implied from a statute)).  
 110. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(3) (2020). 
 111. Norvell, supra note 6, at 464 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4), 
(d)). 
 112. Brief for Appellant at 17, Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, CV-18-223 (Ark. 
June 26, 2018); State Appellants’ Reply Brief at 10, Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. 
Hurd, CV-18-223 (Ark. Aug. 23, 2018). 
 113. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 105. 
 114. Id. at 109 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
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owners, but this is less power than the Commission has when a mineral 
owner leases its interest to the unit operator.115 The Commission will 
determine a competitive royalty rate for an owner who decides to lease 
its interest to the operator through the integration process, but the 
Commission can only cap the participating parties’ royalty obligations 
to the non-consenting owners if it first finds the rate excessive or 
unreasonably high.116 The majority’s holding in the Hurd decision did 
not broaden the Commission’s power; it merely clarified it. 
In addition, the Court acknowledged that the record contained 
evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the 25% royalty 
rate was excessive and unreasonable. The Hurds argued that the rate 
could not be unreasonable because it was the same rate contained in 
previous leases they held with SWN.117 However, the Hurds took a 
chance in including a stratigraphic Pugh clause in their lease in the 
hopes of a higher return.118 Due to a downturn in the market, when it 
came time to re-lease new formations below the Fayetteville Shale 
formation, natural gas prices significantly dropped, resulting in 
reduced lease royalty rates particularly for the unproven Moorefield 
Shale formation.119 In addition, because the Hurds executed the leases 
with their own family-owned businesses in anticipation of integration, 
the Commission had reason to believe that the royalty rate attempted 
by the Hurds was inflated and not comparable to market-based royalty 
rates being utilized in arms-length leases.120  
In contrast, most oil and gas leases are executed under much less 
suspicious circumstances. When the Commission considers whether 
ordinary lease royalty rates are excessive or unreasonable, they will be 
easily distinguishable from the Hurds’ case.121  
Justice Hart warned that the Court’s ruling gives operators no 
reason to negotiate royalty rates with landowners in good faith.122 
However, an applicant for forced integration of a unit must describe 
its due diligence and show that it made a bona fide effort to reach an 
agreement with each owner.123 The applicant must also provide an 
 
 115. Norvell, supra note 6, at 464 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4), 
(d)). 
 116. Id.; Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 105.  
 117. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 110 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 109 (Hart. J., dissenting).  
 119. Id. at 103. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 103, 105.  
 122. Id.  at 109 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 123. 178-00 ARK. CODE R. § 001-A-3(G)(i) (LexisNexis 2020). 
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affidavit showing the highest cash bonus and royalty terms that the 
lessors and lessees contracted for in the unit.124 
These requirements provide the Commission with evidence of what 
is a just and reasonable rate under an integration order. Unit operators 
will still have every reason to negotiate agreeable terms with each 
property owner in a unit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Hurd case was a natural culmination of Arkansas law that 
clarified the authority of the Commission and its relationship with the 
Arkansas courts. Judicial review of a Commission decision allows 
affected parties to challenge the actions of executive agencies, 
ensuring that the Commission regulates oil and gas production within 
the scope of its authority.  
Further, the Commission did not alter a contract in Hurd. The 
compensation owed by the unit operator to the Hurds was not 
contained in a contract or dictated by a statute. Instead, the integration 
order provided that a lease created between the Hurds and their own 
business would set the payment rate. The Commission found this term 
in the integration order to be unfair and amended it accordingly.  
 
 
 124. § 001-A-3(G)(ii). 
